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Effects of Tariffs and Sanitary 
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Low-Value Poultry Trade 
Everett B. Peterson and David Orden 
A competitive partial-equilibrium  spatial model with heterogeneous goods is 
constructed to evaluate effects of the removal of tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, and 
sanitary regulations on world poultry trade. The model distinguishes between '%high- 
value" (mostly  white meat) and "low-valuen  (mostly dark meat) poultry products and 
simulates the trade flows among eight exporting and importing countries and 
regions. Removing all barriers simultaneously has a larger impact on trade than 
removing only tariffs and tariff-rate quotas. Imposition of sanitary barriers against 
U.S. products by Russia shifts trade flows, but does not have large net impacts on 
U.S. producers. 
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Introduction 
World poultry markets represent one of the most rapidly growing sectors of  the food 
industry. Poultry production has risen six-fold since 1965  to over 70 million tons. 
International trade has more than kept pace with this growth. World exports of poultry 
meat rose from approximately 380,000 mt in 1965 to over 8.7 million mt in 2002 (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database). Thus, trade 
accounts for about 10%  of  consumption. 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the effects of  sanitary barriers to poultry 
trade in the context of  the economic incentives and other trade policy decisions that 
determine product flows in international markets. Poultry flocks are susceptible to 
diseases that can spread domestically and across borders. Microbial contamination of 
poultry for human consumption is also a serious problem in the sector, as with other 
meats, and is addressed by health regulations in exporting and importing countries. 
Thus, poultry markets are subject to a complex mix of  national and trade sanitary 
regulations, together with nontechnical barriers in the form of  tariffs and tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQs). The 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture 
and on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures has, to some 
extent, affected this mix, reducing levels of nontechnical border protection while 
tightening the rules for sanitary measures. 
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To evaluate the policy effects on world poultry trade, a perfectly competitive, partial- 
equilibrium spatial  model with heterogeneous goods is constructed to simulate the  trade 
flows among six key non-composite exporting or importing regions (five countries and 
the European Union) and two rest-of-world region aggregates. The model incorporates 
several extensions of  previous work. First, most previous analyses of  the economic 
effects of technical barriers have examined bans on product shipments across a single 
border (e.g., Calvin and Krissoff, 1998;  Paarlberg and Lee, 1998).  Since alternative trade 
opportunities have not been evaluated in these case studies, assessment is precluded of 
arbitrage occurring through trade "deflection" when a bilateral ban leads other exporting 
countries to increase their sales to the specific importing region, with the blocked sales 
going elsewhere in world markets. As will be seen, there is a complex non-transitive set 
of  existing bilateral poultry sanitary barriers between regions, indicating that trade 
deflection plays an important role in global poultry markets. 
The second extension of previous work in our model is the separate identification of 
high-value (mostly white meat) and low-value (mostly dark meat) poultry products. 
Earlier poultry models have aggregated all products into a single category (e.g., Alston 
and Scobie, 1987; Kapombe and Colyer, 1998; Koo and Golz, 1994; Wang et al., 1998). 
Yet, bilateral trade data indicate that most often a country's imports and exports are 
concentrated in either high-value or low-value products. Maintaining this distinction 
significantly affects the benchmark model and simulated results of removing non- 
technical and sanitary trade barriers. Orden, Josling, and Roberts (2002) provide 
a simplified model with products differentiated by high and low value but assumed to 
be homogeneous between regions within each market category. 
The Model 
There are  eight regions in the  model: the  United States  (U.S.),  Brazil, the European Union 
(EU), Japan, China, Russia, a rest-of-world poultry exporting region (ROWE), and a rest- 
of-world poultry importing region (ROWM). The non-composite regions were chosen 
because they account for a significant portion of world poultry production (approximately 
70%) and poultry trade (approximately 90% of  all exports and 75% of all imports). 
Poultry Sector 
All production, processing, and distribution activities within each region are  merged into 
one industry. This level of aggregation is a simplifying assumption and reflects that for 
some regions, such as the United States, the production and processing activities are 
vertically integrated. A positive linear relationship is assumed between an aggregate 
poultry price and aggregate poultry production. 
A wide range of poultry products are  traded and are separated in the model into high- 
value and low-value products. The high-value poultry product includes white meat 
(breasts  and wings) of chicken and  turkey along with de-boned meat and specialty items. 
Low-value poultry is  comprised of mainly dark meat (drumsticks  and thighs) of chicken 
and turkey.' White and dark meats are produced in essentially equal (0.5 shares) and 
The distinction between white and dark meat product categories is consistent with industry characterizations of the 
poultry market (see Fuller, 2003). Peterson and Orden  Poultry Trade Barriers  11  1 
fixed amounts per bird, and are thus treated as  jointly produced goods. The distinction 
among trade flows in high-value and low-value products is important, because most 
countries mainly import (or export) dark (or white) meat due to the preferences of 
domestic consumers relative to production. For example, China and Russia import low- 
value poultry products, the EU imports high-value poultry products, and the U.S., as 
well as the EU, export low-value products. Brazil, in contrast, exports both high- and 
low-value poultry parts. 
Because of the assumption of joint production, the supply responsiveness of the 
poultry sector depends on an aggregate poultry price, which is an average of the high- 
value and low-value prices. Joint production links the high- and low-value supplies and 
thus affects the simultaneous price determination in both markets. The relationship 
between the high-value and low-value poultry prices and the poultry supply response 
can be seen using the definition of the aggregate poultry price: 
where PA  is the aggregate poultry price, P,  is  the high-value poultry price, and PL is the 
low-value poultry price. Totally differentiating equation (I),  converting to percentage 
changes, and multiplying each term on the right-hand side by qA/qA,  where qA  is quan- 
tity of aggregate poultry production and qH  = qL  = 0.5qA,  yields: 
where rH and rL are the revenue shares of  high-value and low-value poultry products, 
respectively. The percentage change in the aggregate poultry price is a revenue share 
weighted average of the percentage changes in the individual poultry prices. Any combin- 
ation of changes in  high-value and low-value poultry prices that increase the aggregate 
poultry price will lead to an increase in both high-value and low-value poultry output. 
Consumer Demand 
Consumer demand for poultry products in each region is represented by a four-level 
nested constant elasticity of  substitution (CES) demand system (see figure 1).  At the 
bottom  level, consumers choose among alternative sources of  imported high-value 
poultry products or low-value poultry products, respectively. We have chosen to use an 
Armington specification due to the variation in unit value across exporters for a given 
importing region (see table 1).  This price variation indicates there are some differences 
across countries in the specific types of high- or low-value products being traded. The 
low-value poultry products being exported from the United States, for example, are not 
exactly the same products as the low-value poultry from the EU or Brazil. 
In the second level of  the nested CES demand system (figure I), consumers choose 
between a domestically produced and an aggregate imported high-value or low-value 
poultry product based on their relative prices. At the third level, consumers choose 
between aggregate high-value and low-value poultry products. If the aggregate price of 
high-value poultry, which is  a function of the  price of imports and the  domestic price 
of high-value poultry, increases relative to the aggregate price of low-value poultry, 112  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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Figure 1. Structure of consumer preferences 
consumers will increase their consumption of  low-value poultry and decrease their 
consumption of high-value poultry. At the top level of the demand system, consumers 
choose between an aggregate poultry product and all other products. This allows for 
consumers to increase or decrease their overall consumption of poultry products as  the 
aggregate relative price of poultry changes. 
Government Policies 
The base year of the model is 1998. During that year, all non-composite regions imposed 
tariffs on imported poultry products. The Japanese import market had the lowest tariffs 
(averaging 10%)  of all of the non-composite regions. This in part reflects the Japanese 
government's encouragement of foreign investment by Japanese poultry firms in Brazil, 
Thailand, and China. The EU restricts poultry imports through TRQs, which are allo- 
cated to Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have 
quota-restricted preferential access under the Europe Agreements. In-quota EU tariffs 
average 20%, and the EU over-quota tariffs are prohibitive. Russia imposes tariffs 
averaging 22.5%. Both the United States (average 25%) and Brazil (average 35%) use 
tariffs to protect their poultry markets even though these countries are relatively low- 
cost exporters. 
Because poultry flocks are susceptible to infectious diseases and microbial contamina- 
tion of poultry meat is a serious problem, many countries have sanitary  (SPS)  regulations 
that impose restrictions on exports from one or several countries. Table 2 summarizes 
whether binding SPS barriers exist between the six non-composite regions in the model. 
One might expect that  these regions would divide into two groups, those free ofhighly 
infectious poultry diseases and those not free of disease, with trade occurring within 
each group. However, this is not the case. The major importers of poultry products, 
China,  Japan, and Russia, accept imports from all exporting regions in the  model. Peterson and Orden  Poultry Trade Barriers  11  3 
Table 1. Unit Value of 1998 World Poultry Trade, SITC Code 01235, "Poultry 
Cuts and Offal, Frozen" ($U.S. per metric ton) 
Importers 
AU Others 
Exporters  U.S.  Brazil  EU  China  Japan  Russia  High Value  Low Value 
U.S.  -  -  -  647  1,112  719  -  808 
Brazil  -  -  2,505  717  1,940  -  1,774  - 
EU  -  -  -  936  -  712  -  710 
China  -  -  -  -  1,890  -  1,563  - 
All Others: 
High Value  -  -  3,264  -  2,060  -  -  - 
Low Value  -  -  -  798  -  885  -  - 
-  -  - 
Source: International Bilateral Agricultural Trade database (USDAIERS),  developed from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development bilateral SITC trade data. 
Note: The trade data contained several instances of very small trade flows, generally less than 500  metric tons 
between regions in the model. Because of their small magnitudes and the likelihood that they represent trade in 
specialty poultry products, these trade flows are dropped from the benchmark trade flows. 
Table 2. Bilateral SPS Barriers to Poultry Trade 
Importers 
Exporters  U.S.  Brazil  EU  China  Japan  Russia 
U.S.  -  Banned  Banned  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed 
Brazil  Banned  -  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed 
EU  Allowed  Allowed  -  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed 
China  Banned  Banned  Banned  -  Allowed  Allowed 
Source: Authors' review of trade-related regulations. 
The two major exporters, the United States  and Brazil, do not accept imports from each 
other and also ban imports from China, based on recurrent outbreaks of Newcastle 
Disease. The EU also bans imports from the U.S. and from China. The main point of 
disagreement between the U.S. and the EU is on the use of end-of-line chlorine decon- 
tamination in U.S. processing facilities. The EU does not consider this to be equivalent 
to trisodiummonophosphate or lactic acid decontamination, and therefore has banned 
poultry imports from the United States. Imports of poultry from Brazil into  the U.S. are 
banned based on intermittent outbreaks of poultry diseases in Brazil, but the EU does 
not block imports from Brazil due to disease problems. Finally, Brazil's SPS barrier 
against imports from the United States is based on the decision that the inspection 
system for poultry processing plants in the U.S. is not equivalent to its own. Thus, 
diverse sanitary barriers applied differently among countries lead to a complex set of 
trade opportunities. 
Data 
The benchmark bilateral trade  flows are obtained from the USDA's International  Bilat- 
eral  Agricultural Trade Database, which is adopted from trade data  of the United Nations 
and contains information on the quantity (in metric tons) and the value of poultry trade 1 14  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
in each category.'  The UN trade data identify six, five-digit SITC categories for trade 
in poultry products. These SITC categories separate poultry into whole birds, cuts, and 
livers, as well as distinguish between fresh or chilled and frozen. The dominant SITC 
category is 01235, "poultry cuts and offal (other  than livers),  frozen," which accounts for 
nearly 70% of  world (excluding intra-EU) poultry trade. Because of  our interest in 
differentiating the distinct markets for high-value and low-value poultry products, our 
analysis is focused specifically on these frozen poultry cuts. The next largest category 
(SITC 012321, "poultry not cut in pieces, frozen," accounts for approximately 20% of 
world poultry tradebut  to retain tractability in our differentiated-product model, we 
exclude this and the four remaining SITC categories. 
The bilateral trade flows within the category of frozen poultry cuts were assigned to 
either high-value or low-value products based on the unit values computed from the 
data (see table 1).  For example, Brazilian exports to Japan and the  EU (with unit values 
of  $1,940 and $2,505, respectively) are assumed  to consist  of  high-value  poultry 
products, while Brazilian and  U.S. exports to China, or U.S. exports to Russia (with unit 
values of $717, $647, and $719, respectively) are assumed to consist of low-value poultry 
products. Table 3 reports quantities ofthe  benchmark bilateral trade  flows in high-value 
and low-value products on this basis. The only gray area in this dichotomy is U.S. 
exports to Japan,  whose unit value does not closely match either category. In  examining 
the U.S. trade data at  the 10-digit Harmonized System (HS)  level, approximately 70% 
of  U.S. exports to Japan are in the category "0207140090" which is defined as "frozen 
other cutsledible offal (inc. livers)." Because nearly all of  U.S. exports to China and 
Russia also fall in the same category, and to avoid creating a second low-value products 
classification in the model, we assume U.S. exports to Japan are low-value  product^.^ 
Given the relatively small amount of  U.S. poultry exports to Japan (76,100 mt), this 
abstraction should not substantially affect the model results. 
The level of poultry production for each region is given in the first column of table 3. 
It is the 1998 estimate of  poultry meat production (obtained from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization FAOSTAT database). The level of poultry production in the 
two composite regions is determined by first identifying which countries (other than 
those already in the model) are  net poultry exporters in FA0  trade data. Then, the level 
of  poultry production in the ROWE region is the sum of production in these exporting 
countries. Poultry production for the ROW  region is obtained by subtracting the 
quantity of poultry meat produced in all other regions in the model from world poultry 
production. 
Data on domestic prices of high- and low-value poultry products by region were 
not available. However, the general magnitude of many of these prices can  be infer- 
red from the reported unit trade values and estimates of  transportation costs.4  Exact 
benchmark domestic prices for each region were determined as part of the model cali- 
bration process. 
The authors are grateful to Mark Gehlhar, ERSNSDA, who provided access to the trade data. 
'Comparing the unit export values within the 10-digit  HS  category between  Japan, China,  and Russia indicates that even 
within this narrow HS category there are product or quality differences. 
Our estimates of transportation costs were made from limited available ocean freight rates and are available from the 
authors on request. Table 3. Benchmark Data (1998) 
Domestic Consumption (+), Exports (+), or Imports (-) 







































Total  Low Value:  31.222 
Total HV  + LV:  62.444 
U.S.  Brazil  ROWE  EU  China  Japan  Russia  ROWM  Net Trade 
<- - - - - - - - - - --  -----  - - - - - -  - -- (million metric  tons) - - - - - - ---  - - - - - ---  - - - ---  - -  -> 
7.619  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.000 
-  2.328  -  0.043  -  0.067  -  0.047  0.157 
-  -  2.654  0.062  -  0.125  -  -  0.187 
-  -0.043  -0.062  4.552  -  -  -  -  -0.105 
-  -  -  -  5.428  0.194  -  0.054  0.247 
-  -0.067  -0.125  -  -  0.194  0.991  -  -  -0.385 
-  -  -  -  -  -  0.345  -  0.000 
-  -0.047  -  -  -0.054  -  -  7.306  -0.101 
----- (million metric tons) - - - - -  -- 
-  0.491  0.076 
-  0.136  - 
-  0.126  - 
3.871  0.139  - 
-0.139  6.565  - 
-  -  0.682 
-  0.145  -  - 
-0.292  -  - 
Sources:  Production derived from Food and Agriculture Organization FAOSTAT database; trade flow data taken from International Bilateral Agricultural Trade Database (USDN 
ERS), developed from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development bilateral SITC trade data; domestic prices derived from model calibration by the authors. 
Note: Due to rounding errors, totals may not add. 116  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Calibration 
The calibration process for the CES demand system begins at  the high- and low-value 
import sub-utility functions because this is the level where both initial quantities and 
expenditure are observed. The CES utility and sub-utility functions, for each region i, 
for each level of the demand system in figure 1  can be expressed as: 
where a,  is a shift parameter to be determined during calibration, x,  is the quantity of 
good j consumed, n is the number of goods consumed, a is the elasticity of substitution 
for that level in the nested CES demand structure, and the regional subscript i is sup- 
pressed for simplicity. The resulting demand function and true  cost-of-living price index 
for each level are then denoted by: 
and 
(5) 
where I  is total or group expenditures,pj is the price of good j, and P,  is the price index. 
Import Sub-utility 
Typically, equation (4)  is calibrated by rescaling all prices to equal one and setting the 
values of a,  equal to the associated import share of that good from region j into region 
i. A problem with this approach at  the level of the import sub-utility functions is that 
if region j does not export to region i in the initial equilibrium, a,  is set equal to zero, 
which then bars the possibility of  region j exporting to region i after reform of trade 
policies occurs. Because removing trade barriers, especially SPS  barriers, could alter  the 
observed pattern of trade, this method of calibrating the a,  is clearly constraining. 
In our calibration, we assume instead that all aj  = a for those countries exporting to 
a given region in a given scenario. Assuming all a's are equal allows them to be removed 
without altering the preference structure of the utility function, eliminating the a, also 
from equations (4)  and (5).  The implication of this assumption is that imports from each 
region with which trade is considered feasible are consumed in equal amounts if all 
import prices are the same. As long as a given region imports high- or low-value poultry 
from at  least one source in the benchmark, our assumption provides a systematic basis 
for evaluating trade of  that product occurring with other regions under alternative 
scenarios. A limitation of the assumption that all a:s  are equal is that the calibrated 
prices cannot be made to exactly match the data-derived export unit values for all 
regions. This is because the differences in relative import quantities are strictly due to 
relative price differences, whereas choice of unique a:s  for each exporting region reflects 
other demand factors affecting  relative import levels. A second limitation of this approach Peterson and Orden  Poultry Trade Barriers  11  7 
is that it does not provide a systematic basis for counter-factual scenarios in cases when 
there are no benchmark imports. In some cases, technical barriers might be thought 
likely to block imports from all sources. A number of disputes over technical barriers to 
poultry trade have been addressed through the  WTO informal dispute consultation 
process (Josling, Roberts, and Orden, 2004). But these cases, as well as other disputes 
on technical barriers brought up at the WTO, generally involve bilateral issues, not 
barriers that preclude all trade. 
Using equation (4)  under our assumption on the ais, the  prices of imported high-value 
or low-value poultry products are determined in calibration to replicate the benchmark 
trade flows and total expenditures on imports by each region. The values of the calibrated 
import prices are also a function of the value of the elasticity of substitution between 
import sources (o,  in figure 1).  The smaller the value of this elasticity, the larger will be 
the calibrated import price differentials between regions. Various values for the import 
elasticity of substitution were tried during the calibration process. Values of less than 10 
resulted in much larger price differentials than the observed differentials in unit export 
values, while values over 10 did not reduce the  price differentials substantially. Therefore, 
the elasticity of substitution between imports is assumed equal to 10 for all regiom5 
To illustrate the price calibration process, consider the imports of high-value poultry 
into Japan. In the benchmark, three regions-Brazil,  China, and the ROWE--export 
385,100 mt of high-value poultry to Japan at avalue  of $752.4 million. A system of three 
equations, representing the quantity of high-value poultry imported from each region, 
in three unknowns (the import prices), is then solved. The resulting import prices are 
assumed to be cost + insurance and freight (c.i.f.) prices. Continuing with the Japan 
example, the calibrated high-value import prices per metric ton for the base model 
scenario are $2,102 for Brazil, $1,889 for China, and $1,974 for ROWE. Subtracting the 
international  transportation costs determines the  corresponding domestic price for each 
of the exporting countries (see table 3).  The domestic price of high-value poultry in Japan 
is estimated to approximately equal the average tariff-inclusive c.i.f. import price. 
For low-value poultry, the domestic prices for the  U.S. and the EU are  averages of the 
calibrated c.i.f. prices for China and Russia less transport costs (ROW  is excluded from 
the  averages because transportation costs are  not known). For Brazil, the domestic low- 
value price is based on the calibrated c.i.f. price for China. For China, Russia, and 
ROWM, the domestic low-value poultry price is set equal to the average tariff-inclusive 
c.i.f. import price in each region. For Japan, the import price and domestic price of low- 
value poultry are set at  the domestic U.S. price plus transportation costs and tariffs. 
While most high-value and low-value domestic  prices can be determined from the  cali- 
brated import prices, tariffs, and estimated transport costs, alternative methods must 
be used for regions that do not export or import a given poultry product. For the  United 
States, the  high-value poultry price is set equal to an  average wholesale price of chicken 
breast, chicken wings, and turkey breast (USDALERS). For Russia, the domestic high- 
value price is set equal to the average domestic high-value price in Brazil, China, and 
ROWE plus the 22.5% tariff rate. Thus, the domestic high-value price in Russia would 
be less than the domestic price of the potential exporters plus transport cost. This 
assumption is made because Russia does not import any high-value poultry, and a 
domestic price less than the exporter's price plus transport cost would discourage high- 
& Alston and Scobie (1987)  considered two different values for this parameter, 3 and 36, in their analysis. A value of 5.0 
is used in conducting a sensitivity analysis of our results. 118  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
value exports to Russia. Finally, because of the  TRQ in the EU, the calibrated high-value 
import prices are not considered accurate reflections of the EU domestic prices. In 1998, 
the average wholesale price for young chickens was approximately $1,75O/mt (European 
Commission, 2002). Hence, the EU high-value poultry price was computed such that the 
simple average of the domestic high-value and low-value price equals $1,750. 
Remaining Demand Parameters 
Once domestic prices for all products have been calculated, the parameters in the 
remaining CES utility and sub-utility functions can also be determined. Since all the 
remaining groups in the nested CES have only two goods, equation (4) simplifies with 
the aj  replaced by a and (1 - a). For example, consider the sub-utility firnctions govern- 
ing the substitution between domestic and imported high-value (low-value) poultry 
products. Then x, is the quantity of  the domestic poultry product consumed, pj is the 
domestic price,p,  is an import price index determined using equation (5) at  the  bottom- 
level import sub-utility function, o is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
imported products (i.e., the  Armington elasticity, or a, in figure I),  and I  is expenditure 
on high-value (low-value)  poultry products. Once an elasticity of substitution is chosen, 
the only unknown parameter that needs to be chosen is the shift parameter a. 
Values for a, and a,  in each region are obtained from the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP)  database (Center  for Global Trade  Analysis, 200 1).  The elasticity of sub- 
stitution between poultry and all else (a,) is set equal to the Allen partial elasticity of 
substitution between  the GTAP commodity "other meat products" (which includes 
poultry meat) and an  all-other-commodity aggregate for each region (see table 4). Given 
that the budget  share for all poultry products  is small, the value of  a, basically 
determines the aggregate own-price demand elasticity for poultry.6 The Armington 
elasticities in the GTAP database vary across products, but not across regions. We use 
a value of a, = 2.5, which is an average between the  two GTAP commodities that include 
live and processed poultry products. 
No estimates of the elasticity of substitution between high-value and low-value  poultry 
products (a,) were available. Because of  the strong consumer preferences for either 
white or dark meats in various regions, such as the preference for white meat versus 
dark meat in the United States and the converse in Brazil and Russia, it is assumed 
that  substitution possibilities in demand between high-value and low-value products are 
limited. Therefore, we assumed an elasticity value of  0.5 for all regions. Based on the 
assumed values of  the elasticities of  substitution and the initial consumption budget 
shares, all poultry products are gross substitutes for one another in all regions. 
The implied own-price uncompensated demand elasticities  for high-value and low-value 
poultry for all regions are  given in table 4. In  general,  the  demand elasticities for domestic- 
ally produced products are inelastic, while the elasticities for imports are elastic. This 
difference is due to much smaller consumption shares for imports. The relatively larger 
demand elasticities for domestic  product in Japan are due to smaller poultry consumption 
shares. These demand elasticities are within the ranges used by previous studies.' 
'The aggregate demand elasticity for poultry is equal to s,(o,  - 1) - o,,  where s,  is  the budget share for all poultry products. 
'Koo and Goltz (1994) assume perfectly inelastic demand; Alston and Scobie (1987) use a demand elasticity of -0.5  for all 
regions; Beck, Hosbins, and Mumey (1994) use demand elasticities of -0.56 for broilers and - 1.09 for turkey; and Wang et 
al. (1998) use poultry demand elasticities of -1.33 and -0.53 for urban and rural consumers in  China. Peterson and Orden  Poultry Trade Barriers  1  19 
Table 4. Demand Elasticities at Initial Prices 
Own-Price Demand Elasticity ' 
Region  01  a  DHVb  IHV  DLV  ILV 
U.S.  0.30  -0.33  -  -0.47  - 
Brazil  0.20  -0.27  -  -0.43  - 
ROWE  0.15  -0.24  -  -0.41  - 
EU  0.20  -0.30  -2.45  -0.46  - 
China  0.25  -0.36  -  -0.60  -2.30 
Japan  0.40  -1.17  -1.75  -0.80  -2.18 
Russia  0.10  -0.32  -  -  1.72  -  1.06 
ROWM  0.20  -0.32  -2.47  -0.68  -2.23 
"Elasticity  of substitution  between poultry products and all other products in consumers' utility function in  figure 
1. The other elasticities of substitution in figure 1  do not vary across countries. The assumed values of a,, a,, and 
a, are 0.5,2.5,  and 10,  respectively. 
bThe  abbreviations DHV, IHV, DLV, and ILVstand for domestic  high-value poultry products, imported high-value 
poultry products, domestic low-value poultry products, and imported low-value poultry products. Cells without 
an entry represent zero consumption in the benchmark data set. 
'The unconditional own-price elasticities for a nested CES utility function are derived based on the formula fiom 
Keller (1980)  for the own-price  Men  partial elasticities of substitution. For example, the own-price  Allen partial 
elasticity of substitution for domestic high-value poultry products is: 
ODrn  - -  [03(C&  - CG) + a,(cG - c,')  + ol(c,'  - I)], 
where c,,,  c,,  and c, are the initial budget shares of domestic high-value poultry, all high-value poultry, and 
all poultry, respectively. Then, the unconditional own-price demand elasticity for domestic high-value poultry, 
noting that the CES utility function is homothetic, is defined as eDrn -  cDrn(oDrn  - 1). The same procedure is 
utilized for the other poultry products. 
Supply Response 
Little empirical evidence exists on poultry supply elasticities across regions. Wang et 
al. (1998)  assumed a supply elasticity of  1.175  for China. Kapombe and Colyer (1998) 
estimated a supply response of  0.13  for U.S. broiler production. Because of the lack of 
supply elasticity estimates across regions, we consider two values. The first  value repre- 
sents a long-run effect where regions have time to build more production and processing 
facilities. For this case, we follow Alston and Scobie (1987)  and assume an aggregate 
supply elasticity of  5  across regions. The second value represents the short run, where 
an aggregate supply elasticity of 0.5  is assumed for all regions. 
Results 
The model developed in the  previous section is used to analyze the impacts on the global 
poultry sector of four alternative policy changes. First, we remove all tariffs and the EU 
TRQ among the six non-composite regions but leave any SPS barriers in place. Second, 
we remove only the SPS barriers. Third, we remove all trade barriers among the six 
non-composite regions, a "free trade" case for these regions. The final policy change is 
drawn from recent events, a Russian ban on low-value imports from the United States 
[see Ames (1998)  for the chronology of one recent dispute]. Results using the long-run 
supply response are reported in table 5.  The base case model production, domestic prices, 
and trade flows correspond with table 3. 120  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 5. Long-Run Model Results 
Remove  Remove  Russian Ban 
Base  Tariffs and TRQs  All Barriers  on U.S. Exports 




















Percentage Change (%) 
2.12  1.65 
4.68  8.61 
3.80  3.41 
-4.18  -4.54 
-3.24  -3.41 
-3.38  -3.85 
-3.98  -4.97 
0.37  0.01 
0.03  0.01 









Percentage Change (%) --------------> 
-1.29  -0.68  1.42  1.57 
1.06  -1.88  0.26  -4.22 
0.96  0.76  0.26  0.02 
-2.79  -2.43  -2.67  -0.66 
4.63  4.49  0.24  -0.03 
-1.89  -1.99  0.32  0.04 
3.00  3.74  -6.26  -2.82 
-0.41  0.02  0.15  0.24 









Percentage Change (%) - 
7.33  4.39 
3.65  17.13 
3.29  3.57 
8.62  6.43 
-9.04  -8.90 
2.88  2.81 
-9.84  -12.29 
1.28  -0.05 
TotalHVExports:  (mil.mt)  <--------------  Percentage Change(%) --------------> 
U.S.  0.000  0.00  0.00 
B  B  -  -  0.00  0.00 
Brazil  0.157  100.90  138.46  74.73  111.97  -0.10  23.63 
ROWE  0.187  78.51  67.62  56.91  49.98  -0.04  -4.49 
China  0.247  -8.37  -13.71  -10.60  -15.64  -0.03  -7.80 
Total:  0.591  48.12  52.42  52.26  55.69  -0.05  1.60 
TotalLVExports:  (mil.mt)  <--------------  P  ercentage Change(%) --------------> 
U.S.  2.038  13.87  8.59  17.43  11.96  -11.79  -13.03 
Brazil  0.136  123.39  299.27  108.37  278.85  -8.93  199.45 
ROWE  0.126  123.89  116.48  109.17  103.94  -9.46  -10.05 
EU  0.576  3.94  -6.15  0.97  -8.23  54.55  14.39 
Total:  2.874  21.85  24.05  22.43  24.51  1.73  2.61 
TotalHVImports:  (mil.mt)  <--------------  P  ercentage Change (%) --------------> 
EU  0.105  243.71  259.90  264.25  275.81  0.00  0.00 
Japan  0.385  9.19  10.16  9.71  10.61  -0.01  0.99 
ROW  0.101  -7.34  -2.71  -6.45  -1.85  -0.28  5.58 
Total:  0.591  48.12  52.42  52.26  55.69  -0.05  1.60 
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Table 5. Continued 
Remove  Remove  Russian Ban 
Base  Tariffs and TRQs  All Barriers  on U.S. Exports 
Variable  [ll  121  131  141  [51  161  171 
Total LV Imports:  (mil. mt)  <- -----  - ----  ---  percentage change (%) - - - - - - --  - - - - - -  > 
China  0.891  72.59  75.68  73.17  76.49  6.07  7.14 
Japan  0.076  14.71  20.16  16.26  21.37  8.93  10.93 
Russia  0.827  8.00  5.91  8.39  6.24  -9.26  -8.88 
ROWM  1.081  -8.87  -4.33  -8.20  -4.11  6.05  7.07 
Total:  2.874  21.85  24.05  22.43  24.51  1.73  2.61 
Note: Due to rounding errors, totals may not add. 
Column Definitions: 
[I] = Base scenario. 
[21 = Maintains bilateral trade patterns from base case. 
[31 =Mows  Brazil to export low-value poultry products to Russia and the ROWM. 
[41 =Maintains bilateral trade patterns from base case, but removal of barriers opens EU  market to U.S. exports. 
[51 =Allows U.S. entry into EU  and Brazil to export low-value poultry products to Russia and the ROWM. 
[61 =Maintains bilateral trade patterns from base case, but eliminates U.S. access to Russian market. 
171  = Eliminates U.S. access, but allows Brazil to export low-value poultry products to Russia. 
"Percentage change cannot be calculated, but exports expand to 111,000 mt and 99,000 mt, respectively, in columns [41 and [51. 
Removal of  Tariffs and TRQs (with SPS barriers still in place) 
In analyzing this policy change, we consider two long-run scenarios. In the first, the 
nontechnical trade  barriers are  removed with the  bilateral trade patterns  remaining the 
same as in the base case. A scenario is then considered where liberalization could 
change the existing trade patterns, even with SPS barriers in place. In particular, a 
scenario is analyzed where Brazil becomes an exporter of low-value poultry to Russia 
and the ROWM region. Given the growth of the Brazilian sector into a major player in 
poultry export markets, there is some potential for Brazil to enter these two markets. 
Finally, given the uncertainty of the magnitude of poultry supply elasticities, these two 
experiments are conducted using the short-run supply responses. 
Long-Run Results 
The removal of all tariffs and TRQs results in the reduction of the relative price of im- 
ported poultry products in all importing regions. This causes an  increase in the demand 
for imported poultry products  in those regions. Trade in high-value and low-value 
poultry products increases by 48.1% and 21.8%, respectively (see table 5, column 21, 
representing an  increase of 913,000 mt, or 26.3%, in the total volume of trade. Because 
low-value poultry products account for the majority of poultry trade in the base case, 
approximately two-thirds of the increase in trade volume is in low-value products. 
The regional impacts depend on import and export patterns of that region and on the 
magnitude of liberalization. For example, the United States is a large exporter of low- 
value products, but does not trade high-value products. Tariff liberalization results in 
an  increase in U.S. low-value exports by 13.8%,  or 282,000 mt (table 5, column 2). The 
largest increase in exports is to China, which has the largest tariff reduction, followed 
by an increase in exports to Russia.'  To satisfy the increase in export demand for low- 
'  Bilateral trade flows are not shown for the scenarios in table 5, but are available from the authors on  request. 122  April2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
value products, the United States must increase poultry production andlor decrease 
domestic consumption of low-value products. The U.S. low-value poultry price increases 
by 8.1%,  achieving both an  expansion in production and a shift in domestic demand from 
low-value products to high-value products. With the  joint nature of poultry production, 
if the expansion in production is greater than the substitution effect in demand, then 
the  price of high-value products will fall. This is the case for the United States, with the 
price of high-value poultry declining by 1.8%. Note that this decrease in the U.S. high- 
value price limits the  expansion in U.S. poultry production because it  offsets much of the 
increase in the U.S. low-value price, leaving a smaller increase in the revenue-share 
weighted U.S. aggregate poultry price. When taking these two effects into account, U.S. 
poultry production increases by 0.9%, or 130,000 mt. 
The impacts of liberalization on Brazil and the aggregate exporting region (ROWE) 
are similar because these regions export both high-value and low-value products in 
relatively equal proportions; hence the increase in exports can be accomplished with an 
expansion in production without requiring large relative poultry price changes. The 
prices of high-value poultry increase by 1.8% and 1.6%,  respectively, in Brazil and the 
ROWE, while low-value poultry prices increase by 2.5% and 2.3%, respectively (table  5, 
column 2). Because the prices of  high-value and low-value poultry products both in- 
crease, the  aggregate poultry price increases by a larger percentage in Brazil and ROWE 
compared to the  United States. Thus, there is a larger expansion in poultry products in 
these regions (6.1% for Brazil and 5.0% for ROWE) than in the U.S. (0.9%). 
China and the EU experience different effects from liberalization because they are 
importers and exporters of poultry products. Consequently, liberalization will result not 
only in an increase in demand for each region's  exports, but an increase in import 
demand by  each region as imports become relatively cheaper than domestic poultry 
(table 5, column 2). The impact on poultry production and prices in China and the EU 
depends on the relative strength of the increase in exports versus imports. China is a 
much larger importer of  low-value poultry than an exporter of  high-value products. 
Coupled with the largest decrease in tariffs, low-value imports increase by 72.6% 
(646,000 mt). The decrease in the demand for Chinese low-value poultry results in a 
9.1% drop in the price of this product. This price reduction in turn leads to a reduction 
in Chinese poultry production, and therefore a reduction in supply of both high-value 
and low-value products. The decrease in the supply of  Chinese high-value poultry is 
greater than the decrease in demand, which is due to Chinese consumers substituting 
relatively lower price low-value poultry for high-value poultry. Thus, the Chinese high- 
value poultry price increases by 4.7% and exports fall by 8.4% (20,000 mt). In the EU, 
the removal of  the TRQ results in an increase in high-value imports of  243.7%, or 
257,000 mt. This is larger than the increase in low-value exports (3.9%, or 22,000 mt). 
The EU high-value poultry price declines, reducing the aggregate EU poultry price and 
therefore EU poultry production. The increase in export demand coupled with a decrease 
in supply leads to an increase in the price of EU low-value poultry. 
Russia is an  importer of low-value poultry products. The removal of tariffs on imported 
low-value poultry products reduces the price of  imports versus domestically produced 
low-value poultry for Russian consumers. This causes consumers to substitute  imported 
low-value poultry for domestically produced low-value poultry. As observed from table 
5 (column 2), the  decrease in demand for Russian low-value poultry leads to a 9.6% price 
reduction and a 3.9% reduction in Russian poultry production. The demand for Russian Peterson and Orden  Poultry Trade Barriers  123 
high-value poultry also decreases as consumers substitute to the relatively less expen- 
sive low-value products. However, this decrease in demand is less than the decrease in 
Russian high-value poultry supply, causing the price of Russian high-value poultry to 
increase by 2.9%. 
Japan  as  well as  the aggregate importing region (ROWM)  import both high-value and 
low-value poultry products. However, we did not include the ROWM in the assumed 
reduction of trade barriers because of limited information about trade policies of these 
countries. Therefore, the  effects of the liberalization modeled are different for these two 
regions. In the initial benchmark, Japan imports roughly five times more high-value 
poultry products than low-value poultry products. Thus, the  removal of Japanese tariffs 
has a larger impact on Japanese high-value product volume. Due to the decrease in the 
relative price of imports, Japanese purchases of imported high-value products increase 
by 35,000 mt (9.2%) while the purchases of low-value products increase by 11,000 mt 
(14.7%).  The substitution of imported for domestic poultry products decreases the  demand 
for Japanese poultry, leading to a 3.2% reduction in Japanese poultry production and 
a 1.8%  decrease in the  Japanese price of high-value products. The drop in the  production 
of  low-value Japanese poultry is greater than the decrease in demand, so its price 
increases by 2.8% (table 5, column 2). In the ROWM  region, liberalization by other 
countries results in the prices of  imported poultry increasing relative to domestically 
produced poultry.  This causes consumers in the ROWM  to substitute domestically 
produced poultry for imports. There is a much larger increase in the demand for ROWM 
low-value poultry versus high-value poultry (because the ROWM region imported 
approximately 10 times more low-value poultry in the base case). Thus, the net 
expansion in ROWM poultry production results in the  price of ROWM low-value poultry 
increasing (1.4%) and the price of ROW  high-value poultry decreasing (-0.4%). 
Entry of Brazil into New Markets 
The third column in table 5 reports the  results for the scenario where tariffs and the  EU 
TRQs are  removed and Brazil enters new markets to export low-value poultry to Russia 
and the  ROW,  becoming a direct competitor with the  U.S. and the  EU. This new entry 
leads to both a substitution and expansion effect (stemming from the assumed demand 
structure) in those markets. Holding expenditures on  imported low-value poultry 
products constant, new entry leads to a reduction in market share for all incumbents. 
However, since the CES demand structure is "variety loving," the price index of imported 
products decreases with new entry leading to an expansion in imports. For the  U.S. and 
the EU, the substitution effect dominates the expansion effect, with exports to Russia 
and the ROWM declining compared to the base case. For Brazil, the substitution and 
expansion effects in Russia and the ROWM reinforce one another, leading to a 300% 
increase in Brazilian low-value exports. This is a much larger increase in Brazilian low- 
value exports compared to the previous scenario. 
The main impact from the larger increase in Brazilian low-value exports is that the 
price of  Brazilian low-value poultry increases relative to the U.S. and EU low-value 
poultry prices-an  opposite result compared to the previous scenario. This helps the 
U.S. and the EU increase their sales of low-value poultry to China, due to the substitu- 
tion effect, and allows both countries to stem some of the loss of sales in Russia and the 
ROWM. However, compared to the previous scenario, the U.S. and the EU experience 124  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
smaller increases in the price of low-value products. The U.S. has a smaller overall in- 
crease in poultry production (0.5%),  while the EU experiences a larger overall decrease 
in poultry production (-4.1%). 
Short-Run Results 
In  the short run, because poultry producers cannot respond as  much to changes in poultry 
prices, trade liberalization would be expected to have smaller effects on production and 
trade, compared to those shown in table 5 for the long run.'  All regions experience a 
smaller increase or smaller decrease in poultry production in the short run. Because of 
the smaller production expansion in poultry exporting countries, in the short run there 
is a 10%-15% smaller increase in high-value poultry trade and approximately 5% 
smaller increase in low-value poultry trade. 
With an inelastic supply response, one would also expect trade liberalization to have 
larger impacts on price changes compared to the longer-run scenario. However, due to 
the  joint production of high-value and low-value poultry products, this is not always the 
case. For example, the decrease in the price of U.S. high-value poultry is smaller in the 
short run than in the long run. This is because a smaller increase in U.S. poultry 
production in the short run puts less downward pressure on the U.S. high-value price. 
Similarly, there is a smaller increase in the Chinese high-value price and the EU low- 
value price. Smaller reductions in poultry production in both regions in the short run 
imply relatively larger supplies and smaller price increases. Finally, a smaller  reduction 
in Russian poultry production in the short run provides enough additional high-value 
poultry whereby the price decreases in the short run compared to a price increase in  the 
long run. 
Removal of SPS Barriers Only 
In this scenario, all of the SPS barriers listed in table 2 are removed.1° With the EU's 
TRQs still in place, removal of the SPS barriers on U.S. and Chinese imports is moot 
because these countries do not have quota rights. Thus, only the U.S.'s ban on Brazilian 
and Chinese poultry products and Brazil's ban 0nU.S. and Chinese poultry products are 
effectively removed. Since the United States is a large exporter of low-value poultry, it 
is only likely that Brazil or China would export high-value poultry products to the U.S. 
But given the size of the U.S. poultry sector and the differences in the base prices plus 
Because the base value of  10 for the elasticity of substitution among import sources (0, in figure 1)  may be considered 
too high, we also examined each long-run and  short-run  scenario using an  elasticity ofsubstitution of 5 among import sources. 
The effect of reducing this parameter is to lessen the substitution effect between competing imports relative to the expansion 
effect due to lower import prices aRer the removal of  existing tariffs. Because the majority of poultry trade is in low-value 
products and the United States is the least cost low-value producer, a smaller substitution effect means smaller increases 
in U.S. low-value exports. When the existing trade patterns are maintained, the gains in U.S. low-value exports are 40% to 
50% lower (long run and short run) than reported in the text. If Brazil enters the Russian and ROWM  low-value poultry 
markets, then U.S. low-value exports do not significantly increase. Again, these results are available kom the authors on 
request. 
10 This does not necessarily imply that all such regulations are unnecessary or protectionist in intent. Full risk-based 
evaluations of the impact of alternative sanitary regulations and the consequences of their modification are needed to inform 
judgments about whether a particular regulatory barrier is  an  efficient and  effective  way of controlling health dangers. Here, 
we limit our analysis to the effects of removing these barriers between our aggregated regions, without providing an assess- 
ment of whether doing so would raise sanitary risks among these trading partners. Peterson and Orden  Poulw Trade Barriers  125 
transportation costs, lifting of the  U.S. SPS  barriers is unlikely to generate a significant 
amount of export sales. The same is true for U.S. or Chinese exports to Brazil. Thus, 
removing these barriers alone does not really create the potential for increased trade. 
These are not the strongest results from our model because, in the absence of  any 
imports by Brazil or the  United States  in the benchmark data, a preference for imports 
would have to be arbitrarily specified to induce any trade. For the reasons given above, 
we chose not to set a nonzero value of this parameter. 
Free Trade 
In this scenario, all nontechnical and SPS barriers are simultaneously removed. The 
most important effect comes from the removal of the EU's TRQs and SPS  barriers which 
we assume allows for access to the EU high-value poultry market for U.S. poultry 
producers.''  The main impact of this policy change, seen by comparing the results in 
columns 4 and 5 in table 5 with those in columns 2 and 3, is an  expansion of U.S. high- 
value and low-value exports relative to other exporters. With new market access to its 
high-value poultry market, the United States exports around 100,000  mt of high-value 
poultry to the EU. The drop in the U.S. high-value poultry price is less when all trade 
barriers are  removed than  with only the  nontechnical trade  barriers removed. This leads 
to a greater expansion in U.S. poultry production. With more U.S. low-value poultry 
produced, the low-value price increase is smaller when all trade barriers are removed 
and the U.S. is able to further expand its low-value poultry exports. 
Russian Ban on U.S.  Low-Value Poultry Imports 
Russia is a major market for U.S. low-value poultry products, accounting for nearly one- 
third of  all U.S. low-value poultry exports in 1998. An import ban on U.S. low-value 
poultry by Russia would reduce the demand for U.S. low-value poultry products while 
increasing the  demand for these products from U.S. competitors. Consequently, the  price 
of U.S. low-value poultry falls while the prices of low-value poultry from Brazil and the 
EU increase. As shown in the last two columns of table 5, the U.S. low-value poultry 
price decreases by 6.4% to 7.0% compared to the base price. The changes in Brazilian 
and EU low-value poultry prices depend on whether or not Brazil is assumed to export 
to Russia. Without access to the Russian market, the Brazilian price remains virtually 
unchanged, and the EU price increases 14.5%. With access to the Russian market, the 
Brazilian low-value price increases 17.5%,  while the EU low-value price increases 3.6%. 
With either change in relative prices, the United States increases its low-value exports 
to China and the ROWM. Increased U.S. exports to these regions offset some of the loss 
of exports to Russia, yielding an overall reduction in U.S. low-value exports of  11.8% to 
13.0%. The change in U.S. poultry production is much smaller (- 0.7%)  because the  lower 
price of low-value poultry products leads to increased domestic consumption. 
"  Simultaneous removal of the tariff-rate quota and SPS barriers might also give China access to the EU market, but 
exports from China are mostly labor-intensive processed products targeted at the Japanese market. Consequently, we did 
not include EU access by China in the reported model. 126  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
This study  has  utilized a competitive partial-equilibrium spatial model with heterogene- 
ous goods to  examine the effects of nontechnical and sanitary  barriers that  impede  world 
poultry trade. The model draws a key distinction between high- and low-value poultry 
products, which are  jointly produced but have distinct patterns of trade among the  eight 
countries and regions in the  model. On the demand side, a four-level nested CES system 
is specified in which imported poultry products in the high- and low-value categories 
compete with the similar goods produced domestically. The model is calibrated under 
the assumption that imports by a region would be consumed in equal amounts if all 
import prices were the same. From this calibration, we replicate observed trade flows, 
and derive import and domestic prices consistent with the benchmark data. 
The simulation results suggest that nontechnical barriers to trade among the eight 
countries and regions have significant effects on world markets. Under our long-run 
elasticities, global trade would expand by more than 25%  if nontechnical trade barriers 
were removed by the major importers. Removing nontechnical and sanitary barriers 
simultaneously creates additional trade opportunities compared to removing only non- 
technical barriers-in  our case, primarily from the additional access the United States 
gains to the EU market. 
The disaggregated results  for high- and low-value poultry products also yield insights 
about the effects of trade policies on each of these poultry markets. Production falls in 
the major importing regions with removal of trade barriers, but the  joint production of 
high- and low-value poultry, as well as  increased trade flows, determine the effects on 
specific prices (and marketed quantities) within each country. When Brazil is assumed 
to enter low-value poultry markets of Russia and the ROWM region as  new markets, 
effects on production and exports resulting from trade policy reform are reduced for the 
U.S. and EU, and their exports are  partly diverted to China. Similarly, if U.S. products 
are excluded from Russia, as has occurred several times based on ostensible sanitary 
concerns, arbitrage opportunities partially ease the impact on the U.S. poultry sector. 
Thus, our results show that both nontechnical and sanitary barriers matter to world 
poultry markets, as  do market arbitrage possibilities. 
[Received December 2002;Jinal revision received November 2004.1 
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